In 2010, Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. destabilized the world of securities litigation by denying those who purchased their securities outside the U.S. the ability to sue in the U.S. (as they had previously often done). Nature, however abhors a vacuum, and practitioners and other jurisdictions began to seek ways to regain access to U.S. courts. Several techniques have emerged: (1) expanding settlement classes so that they are broader than litigation classes and treating the location of the transaction as strictly a merits issue that defendants could waive; (2) adopting U.S. law as applicable to securities issued abroad by crosslisted companies (as Israel has done); (3) use of the Netherland's WCAM statute to effect a global resolution of a settlement class; and (4) coordination between the courts in both jurisdictions in the case of a cross-listed stock. On the horizon is still a more ambitious technique: use of supplemental jurisdiction to permit a class of foreign claimants to be combined with a class of U.S. claimants. Early decisions have divided on this technique. This article suggests guidelines for courts to follow in whether to allow foreign claimants in securities actions to re-enter the U.S.
U.S. courts was actually small, several settlements or judgments just prior to Morrison had each exceeded $1 billion and raised deep anxieties in the business community. 5 In any event, Morrison, reversed this "conduct or effect" test and held that the antifraud provisions of the U.S. federal securities laws reached only securities transactions that occurred in the U.S. This made the location of the trade critical, and many litigants formerly covered were now barred from recovery in U.S. courts. To illustrate, if a stock were cross-listed on the New York Stock Exchange and the stock exchange of any of London, Toronto or Tel Aviv, the claims of those shareholders who had purchased on the non-U.S. exchange could not be included in the U.S. class action (and thus they could seemingly not share in the settlement). Perhaps, these purchasers could sue in their own country or some other country where the stock was listed, but most of the world lacks a U.S. style "opt-out" class action that covers all class members who do not formally exit the action (or "opt out" in the parlance). Thus, most foreign shareholders, including those holding "negative value" claims, 6 were simply out of luck.
That was the starting point. The focus of this article is not Morrison, but the reaction to it.
Relatively quickly, practitioners and other nations responded to Morrison, by seeking means by which their clients (much like Lord Denning's moth) could find a way back into the United . Some of these cases were "f-cubed" cases, in which the plaintiffs, the defendants, and the trading were all foreign to the U.S. Morrison was such a case, and most expected the Court to reject "f-cubed" cases, but the Court wrote far more broadly. 6 "Negative value" claims are legal claims that, although meritorious, would cost the plaintiff more to enforce than the recovery would provide the plaintiff. In part, this is the product of the "American rule" under which each side bears its own legal costs.
States. Because foreign investors, particularly institutional ones, had become accustomed to participating in U.S. securities class actions (and receiving their share of the settlement without having to make any out-of-pocket payment), they understandably wanted either a substitute forum or a way to participate in U.S. settlements. Nature, it is said, abhors a vacuum, and a consequence of Morrison was the appearance of a seeming vacuum to which plaintiff's attorneys across a variety of jurisdictions responded with various attempts to fill the void. The clearest reactions to Morrison were in Canada and Israel, two jurisdictions with high numbers of companies cross-listed in the U.S. 7 In Israel, which has a particularly large number of firms cross-fitted in the U.S. for the size of its economy, Morrison seems to have provoked a change in Israeli law. 8 Another important consequence of Morrison has been the increased use of the Netherland's WCAM statute. 9 That statute, originally enacted to deal with mass tort cases, permits a settlement class covering foreign plaintiffs to be filed and approved in the Netherlands so long as there is at least a token Netherlands plaintiff. Although the WCAM statute seemingly enables a global class to be resolved, it permits only a settlement class, not a litigation class.
Thus, one can settle, but not sue, under WCAM.
This ability to settle when you cannot be sued raises a special danger: defendants may seek to reach a collusive (and cheap) settlement on a global basis in order to forestall litigation in a variety of forums. By offering lucrative attorney's fees to class counsel for a cheap settlement, 7 For an overview as of 2010 of the reaction in Canada, see Adam C. Pritchard and Janis P. Morrison, and, more to the point, raised an "individual" issue as to the location of each bond's trade. Under the procedural rules applicable to class actions in the United States, a class can be certified only if the common issues of law and fact "predominate" over the individual issues.
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Because the location of these bond trades (or, in the parlance, their "domesticity") was an individual issue that had to be decided with respect to each individual trade, the Second Circuit reversed Judge Rakoff's certification order and remanded the case to the district court for further proceeding to see if other evidence as to the bonds' domesticity could be obtained.
This ruling seemed to imply that the Petrobras bonds (unlike the Petrobras common stock) could not be included in the class. But, on remand, the case took an unusual turn. The bottom line here is that these decisions appear to give the defendant great discretion over whether cases that cannot be certified as litigation classes can be instead certified as settlement classes. If defendants have broad discretion in this regard, the likelihood is high that they may use this power to agree to a settlement class chiefly when the settlement terms favor it and undercompensate the class. Plaintiff's counsel, having no ability to get to trial and thus being "disarmed", may agree to such a settlement either because (a) it is the best that the class can get, or (b) the fees the plaintiff's attorneys will receive if the settlement is approved more than adequately compensate them (although not the class).
In truth, this is precisely the same problem that the WCAM statute also raises. If the only route to a recovery is through a settlement class, defendants have a veto power over the terms of the settlement and may exploit that power to insist on a cheap settlement far below the settlement that would have negotiated if a litigation class could have been certified.
To be sure, the facts of Petrobras do not reveal any such overreaching. The case only went marginally beyond the outer limits of the earlier litigation class to the extent that the and compromises, given that both promise and peril surround the use of settlement classes to achieve global resolution.
II. CROSS-BORDER LITIGATION:
How Many Ways are There to Skin the Morrison Cat?
Two nations --Canada and Israel --share (1) a significant number of companies incorporated in their jurisdiction and cross-listed on a U.S. exchange, and (2) legal rules that permit a procedure functionally equivalent to an American "opt out" class action. The presence of these two factors distinguishes them from other countries (for example, the United Kingdom)
that have many companies cross-listed in the U.S. but no class action procedure (at least none applicable to securities fraud cases). Given that a local class action procedure was available, it
should not surprise that, in response to Morrison, plaintiff's attorneys in each jurisdiction used their class action device to represent local residents who, because they had purchased the securities of cross-listed firms on their own country's exchange, could no longer participate in a U.S. class action settlement. It was also unsurprising that bolder attorneys, anticipating the prospect of a larger recovery (and hence a large attorney's fee), sought to represent investors in a domestically incorporated firm on a global basis. Immediately, this raised the prospection of competition between the domestic class action and the U.S. class action, and the resolution of each is inevitably affected by the other. As next discussed, courts in both Canada and Israel have been sensitive to this problem --but in different ways.
A. Canada. Canada did not provide a legal remedy for secondary market purchasers until 2005 when Ontario enacted legislation that has now been subsequently adopted in a similar
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form by most of the other major Canadian provinces. 17 Previously, only those who bought in the primary market (i.e., from the issuer or its underwriters) had a statutory cause of action. This statutory revision made it possible to bring in Canada the classic U.S.-style "stock drop" class action covering all persons who had purchased a Canadian issuer's shares based on allegedly materially false information.
Canadian plaintiff's attorneys were not slow in seeking to exploit this new opportunity.
The first significant case that revealed the potential for conflict between U.S. and Canadian class actions was Silver v. IMAX. 18 Following a financial restatement by this firm that had pioneered a special film technology, overlapping class actions were filed in both the U.S. and Canada. The U.S. case proceeded more quickly, and a tentative settlement was reached. But the problem with achieving a settlement was that the Canadian action purported to represent many of the same class members, and the defendant issuer did not want to face the prospect of additional liability to the same class members after they were paid under the U.S. settlement. To reach a resolution, the U.S. and Canadian judges conferred and came to an agreement: the U.S. court made its approval of the settlement contingent on an amendment of the Canadian class definition to exclude all plaintiffs bound by the U.S. decision. 19 The Canadian court accepted this compromise. 20 As a practical matter, this informal resolution produced the equivalent of a global class action, because virtually all shareholders of IMAX Corp. were covered by one of the two settlements. Both courts approved the settlement as fair and reasonable. 17 See Pritchard and Sarra, supra note 7, at 5 (noting that five other Canadian provinces followed Ontario by 2008). Morrison probably simplified the border warfare that had begun to erupt between U.S.
and Canadian class actions because it was no longer possible for U.S. class actions to cover
Canadians --unless they had purchased on the U.S. exchanges (as often they had). Still, Canadian counsel could "poach" class members that were lawfully within the U.S. class definition. For example, a Canadian class definition could seek to cover all shareholders of a Canadian class action or less ambitiously, all Canadian citizen or residents, even if they purchased on a U.S. exchange. The resolution in Silver v. IMAX Corp was not a broad decision that Canadian courts would not cover Canadians who purchased in the U.S., but was more narrowly based on the fact that a tentative settlement had been reached in the U.S. case, and neither court wanted to delay the distribution of the proceeds to the class members in that case (which of course included Canadians who had purchased on U.S. exchanges). Unsurprisingly, this effort to make Canada a base for global securities litigation failed. The
Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the lower court, which had ruled that jurisdiction must be based on one of four "presumptive connecting factors" for tort claims: (1) the defendant is domiciled or resident in the province; (2) the defendant carries on business in the province; (3) the tort was committed in the province; or (4) a contract connected with the dispute was made in the province. 24 Specifically, Yip held that a foreign holding company that supervises a global enterprise does not "carry on business" in Canada. 25 Nor did the fact that Canadian investors could access this company's disclosure online in Ontario establish jurisdiction. 26 Rather, before a corporation may be said to carry on business in Ontario (and presumably most other Canadian provinces whose statutes are similar), it must have a physical presence in the jurisdiction that is accompanied by a degree of sustained business activity. 27 Arguably, these standards are comparatively expansive and would appear to permit many foreign corporations to be sued in Canada, even if they are not listed on Canadian exchanges. Semiconductor Ltd. 37 the Israel Supreme Court was faced with an Israeli company that was dually listed on NASDAQ and the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange ("TASE"). It upheld a lower court that had ruled that the substantive law governing a dual-listed company alleged to have breached its disclosure obligations was the law of the foreign jurisdiction on which the shares are traded (which just happened to be the U.S.).
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Although the stock in Tower Semiconductor traded overwhelmingly in the United States, the actual class in this case consisted exclusively of holders of securities purchased on TASE (and not in the U.S.). 39 This result seems strange at first glance: the claims of shareholders in a domestic company who traded on their own country's exchange are to be determined by the law of a foreign jurisdiction. It is doubtful that Canada would do the same (i.e., applying U.S. law) with respect to purchasers on the Toronto Stock Exchange of a dual-listed Canadian company.
But the result does give a cause of action to Israeli citizens who once would have been included in the U.S. class and is likely to produce outcomes that are consistent with the outcomes of the U.S. litigation. 40 In short, the net result is to fill the void left by Morrison.
C. The Netherlands and WCAM. Still a third way for plaintiff's attorneys to respond to Morrison on behalf of their foreign clients is to utilize the WCAM statute in the Netherlands, which permits a global settlement class. 41 Of course, this will require that the defendants enter into a settlement, but that consent can be induced. Although the Netherlands has no procedure equivalent to a U.S. style "opt out" class action, it does permit a procedure that, when aggressively implemented, can produce a functional equivalent to an "opt-in" class action. Under largely underwrote the litigation and negotiated financing for it with third party funders). The stichting procedure has, of course, one major limitation: a stichting cannot represent absent parties who have not joined the stichting. To reach a truly global settlement covering everyone, the parties in Fortis turned to the WCAM statute. Evidently, Fortis (and its successor, Ageas)
were concerned that if they settled with the several stichtings suing them, other plaintiffs would continue to come out of the woodwork, each time seeking to better the last settlement.
The settlement initially proposed in the Fortis litigation under the WCAM statute illustrated the problems that sometimes attend settlement classes in the U.S.: some class members do markedly better than others. Specifically, the Fortis settlement, as proposed, would pay more to "active" class members (meaning those who had belonged to the original stichtings)
than to "passive" class members (meaning the absent parties picked up through use of the WCAM statute). Although this disparity could be rationalized based on these plaintiff's earlier involvement and individual decision to opt in, the real difference may have been that most of those brought into the "opt-out" WCAM class never learned of the action and could not therefore object to the difference in payout. To its credit, the Amsterdam Court of Appeals rejected the settlement because of this disparity, but made clear that the class could be approved if this disparity was eliminated. 42 Eventually, the parties complied, and the settlement was approved in 2018. 43 The total settlement came to over $1.5 billion --nearly four times the earlier Royal Dutch Shell settlement and a record for Europe.
A recovery on this scale motivates others (much as the reports of gold at Sutter's Mill sparked the Gold Rush of 1849). Unsurprisingly, similar stichting actions are now pending 42 In June 2017, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal rejected the settlement, primarily because of the preferential terms given to the "active" shareholders. See Alison Frankel, "Dutch court approves $1.5 billion Fortis shareholder dealbut there's a catch," Reuters, Latest Venture Capital News, July 16, 2018. 43 Ageas was forced to increase the settlement from $1.33 billion to $1.5 billion to equalize the payments to the passive shareholders. Id. against Volkswagen (for its evasion of test controls) and Petrobras, 44 but these actions remain at an early stage. Nonetheless, the basic WCAM strategy has become established and seems to have two steps: (1) sue through one or more stichtings and demonstrate the viability of plaintiff's claims, and (2) once a settlement becomes likely, convert the litigation into a WCAM proceeding so that the defendant can obtain global relief and cover all persons who would be within the scope of an "opt-out" class action. In effect, there is a gear shift from an "opt-in" to an "opt-out" class, which is at the defendants' discretion. Of course, all class members have a right to opt out, but few exercise it (either in U.S. class actions or WCAM actions). Important legal issues remain, including how the parties can give legally adequate notice to persons around the world.
But the WCAM procedure has the clear potential to achieve a global resolution (particularly in mass tort cases), and a stop in the Netherlands may become standard in attempts by counsel to resolve all claims in a major international case.
D.
Petrobras and the Expansion of Settlement Classes. As noted earlier, the Petrobras settlement expanded a litigation class that the Second Circuit had rejected as overbroad into an even more expansive settlement class, which the district court approved as fair and reasonable. In fact, the expansion in Petrobras was fairly modest. Under the settlement class, all purchasers had to have either purchased their securities in the U.S. or settled through the Depository Trust
Company. This last category covered bond holders, most of whom probably did transact in the U.S. (but some of whom who probably did not). In light of the Second Circuit's rejection of the first settlement, objectors claimed that this was impermissible --both on the theory that those 44 On September 19, 2018, the Rotterdam District Court ruled that, under traditional principles of international law, it had jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against Petrobras in a collective action, and it refused to stay the action pending resolution of actions in Brazil and the U.S. It did find, however, that it lacked jurisdiction with respect to certain nonDutch defendants. See Stibbe, "Rotterdam District court rules on jurisdiction in Petrobras collective action." See www.stibbe.com/en/news/2018/december/rotterdam-district-court-rules-on-jurisdiction-in-petrobras-collective-action. As a matter of full disclosure, the author acknowledges that he has served as an expert witness for Petrobras in this Dutch proceeding.
who purchased extraterritorially should not have been permitted into the settlement class at all and on the somewhat subtler theory that a "fundamental conflict" existed between the interests of those who purchased inside the U.S. and those who purchased outside, which conflict required at a minimum the use of subclasses and different counsel for each subclass.
In response, Judge Jed Rakoff, the district court judge hearing the case, answered:
"What this boils down to as a practical matter is that certain claimants who would have been unable to join the litigation classes previously certified by the Court because of extraterritorial impediments are now included in the settlement class so that the defendants can buy "global peace." In the Second Circuit, plaintiffs are entitled to settle even entirely non-meritorious claims." Still, a "fundamental conflict" might often exist between these different claimants that would require subclassing and different counsel. In short, although defendants can waive a "merits" issue such as "domesticity," the "weaker" claimants could not receive the same settlement 45 In re Petrobras Securities Litigation, supra note 13, at p. 11. 46 amount as the "stronger" claimants. Rather, these would need to be "structural assurances of fair and adequate representation for the diverse groups and individuals" 49 within the class, which generally means that separate counsel would be required for each subclass.
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In short, one may be able to outflank Morrison by using a settlement class to cover extraterritorial claimants (such as, hypothetically, purchasers on the London Stock Exchange), and the defendants could again waive the "merits" issue of "domesticity." But this takes one only so far. One would still need to divide the class into domestic and foreign subclasses (each with different counsel). These counsel would be expected to bargain for their subclass so that the settlement paid a much higher amount per share to the domestic shareholders.
Why did this not happen in Petrobras? The short answer was that the differences between the various class members were relatively minor, and the court found that sophisticated lead plaintiffs had endorsed the settlement's allocation of the proceeds. If these lead plaintiffs, holding only securities purchased in the U.S., were willing to waive the issue of "domesticity,"
the court doubted that there could be any "fundamental conflict."
So where are we left? Petrobras shows that one can expand a settlement class incrementally, but one may need to use a complicated subclassing procedure. Moreover, defendants cannot be certain that these subclasses with new counsel will reach the resolution (and distribution of the proceeds) that they intended. In short, there is a large element of uncertainty. These supplemental claims (i.e., the foreign cause of action) could either be filed in the original lawsuit or could be added by an intervener.
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Inherently, this action would share the same key factual allegations (i.e. some alleged misstatements or omissions by the same issuer), and it could be filed as a class action under U.S.
procedural rules. This idea of parallel actions under different nations' laws has been discussed by 51 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), once the district court has original jurisdiction over some claims (hypothetically, a domestic securities class action), it also gains supplemental jurisdiction "over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action with such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the U.S. Constitution." Thus, the foreign claims need to share the same nucleus of facts as the domestic claims, but that will seldom be an obstacle in a securities fraud case. In the case of securities fraud actions, the claims will usually be substantially related because the same allegedly misleading disclosures are usually released in both the domestic and foreign market. Section 1367(c) then identifies circumstances in which the court can decline such jurisdiction. See infra at note 60. 52 See United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) . 53 See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006). 54 28 U.S.C. 1367(a) expressly provides in its final sentence that supplemental jurisdiction includes claims "that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties." academics, 55 but only seldom attempted. The most recent effort in 2018 proved unsuccessful. 56 In In re Mylan N.V. Secs. Litig., 57 the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a securities class action under Israeli law with respect to purchases on TASE. In part it did so because two similar class actions against the same defendant were already pending in Israel. 58 But in addition, the court wrote:
he United States has only a minimal interest, if any, in providing a forum to litigate the claims of foreign stockholders under foreign securities laws." 59 Other U.S decisions have shown greater willingness to consider foreign securities claims. 60 Of course, now that Israel has deemed U.S. law to apply to cross-listed stocks that are traded in both the U.S. and Israel, the first reason listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1367 for declining supplemental jurisdiction (i.e. that the claim is "novel or complex") seems no longer applicable. 61 A U.S. court can easily apply U.S. law to Israeli claims in both litigation and settlement classes (although, to be sure, this might tend further to make the U.S. a "Shangri-La for lawyers").
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Still, this analysis applies only to Israeli-listed stocks. In the case of stocks listed, for example, on the London Stock Exchange, U.K. law would presumably apply, and this might present a "novel or complex issue" for the court under § 1367(c).
The bottom line at this time is that U.S. courts can consider foreign law claims, but have divided in their willingness to do so. Nonetheless, one special case is easier: settlement classes.
Consider, for example, a stock listed on both the New York and London Stock Exchanges.
Plaintiff's attorneys in the U.S. and the defendant reach a deal on a settlement of the U.S. claims, but the defendant also wishes to cover the London-based claims as well. The plaintiff's attorneys have no objection because a larger case normally means a larger fee award in the U.S. Thus, a class action under U.K. law is filed before the same court, which is asked to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the new claims. The court is further informed by the parties that, unless a "global deal" and "global peace" can be negotiated, the defendant is unwilling to settle. Now, the court has a motivation to accept the foreign law claims, because in substance it means less work for it, as a global settlement will typically eliminate a very messy and time consuming prior to the holding in Tower Semiconductor that U.S. substantive law applies in the case of a dual listed stock, it should be even easier for a federal court today to follow Roofer's Pension Fund after that development. 61 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), district courts have discretion to refuse to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if "(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law…"
Ordinarily, Israeli law would present novel issues for a U.S. judge, but after Tower Semiconductor, supra note 37, the U.S. judge need not face these issues as it has been instructed by Israeli courts to apply U.S. law. 62 See supra note 58, citing language in Morrison.
case from its docket. One small detail, however, detracts from this happy outcome: the settlement gives the foreign claimants who traded in the U.K. somewhat less per share than those trading in the U.S. will receive. This is a scenario that both hints at collusion, but also provides credible reasons why a court might blink and exercise its supplemental jurisdiction.
III. HOW TO BALANCE PROMISE AND PERIL
The foregoing analysis has suggested that the easiest way to fill the void left by Morrison is through settlement class actions. These could be accepted by a U.S. court pursuant to its supplemental jurisdiction; or they could be certified as a settlement class that expands upon a litigation class (possibly with subclasses if a "fundamental conflict" exists); or a Dutch court could certify a WCAM settlement class. All these techniques have promise because they give remedies to purchasers in countries that lack a class action remedy. And they have peril because they invite collusion between plaintiff's attorneys and defendants.
But does one want to encourage such actions? Would Congress or the courts respond with hostility because they believe that creating such a forum in the U.S. would produce a return of allegedly abusive "f-cubed" class actions? Or do they simply not want to allow the U.S. to become a forum for global resolution because it might cause foreign issuers to flee the U.S.?
This Part will consider these questions under two headings: (a) Protections Against Collusion, and (b) Should the U.S. Become a Forum for Global Resolution.
A. Protections Again Collusion.
To the extent collusion occurs, it typically involves an implicit deal between plaintiff's attorneys and defendants that subordinates the interests of class members (here, the foreign class members). What protections are feasible? Reciprocity is normal in many professions. Moreover, if the parties to a U.S. class action settlement wish to add a foreign class to achieve a global settlement, the law firm they invite to represent this new class may see little downside. The actual work on the case will have been already done, and a fee determined as a percentage of the recovery can be very attractive.
Thus, a second safeguard should be to disfavor presumptively any settlement of a securities fraud suit in which there is a material difference in the amount received on a per share basis by the two classes. An absolute rule would be too strict, because there can be relevant differences in circumstances. Still, we can expect defendants to try and make the same distinctions between claimants as was attempted (and rejected) in the Fortis litigation.
2.
Comity. Another means to this same end may be obtainable through the doctrine of comity. Suppose there is a U.S. securities class action brought against a company that is dual listed on the NYSE and Toronto Stock Exchanges. Suppose further that the U.S. class action is settled and the settlement class is extended to cover those who traded in Toronto. Alternatively, a
Canadian settlement class is presented to the U.S. court to be approved under the court's supplemental jurisdiction. Assume that the U.S. court approves both classes (possibly because defendants insist that they will only settle on a global basis).
But must a Canadian court respect this settlement, even if it extinguishes claims that were then pending before it? In a contrast to a case in State X that also resolves claims of citizens in State Z, the constitutional requirement of "full faith and credit" does not apply in this international setting. Only the doctrine of international comity does, and it is a doctrine with weaker presumptions and more limitations.
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Indeed, Canadian case law has clearly held that its courts are not required to respect a settlement of a U.S. class action that settles claims over which it also has jurisdiction. In Currie could obtain more, the incentive for defendants to enter into a settlement class in the United
States would be greatly diminished. But some degree of uncertainty on the issue of res judicata may be desirable, because it will deter defendants from seeking to impose the cheapest possible terms on the foreign class. At present, there is at least a warning signal to those settling Canadian claims in the U.S. that a Canadian court may review for fairness.
B. Should the U.S. Become a Forum for Global Resolution?
Cases such as Vivendi in which plaintiffs won an initial judgment for $9 billion sent shock waves through the international business community. 65 Arguably, Vivendi told foreign corporations listed in the U.S. that they faced unascertainable and potentially catastrophic liability. Beyond simply this economic fear, there is also a fear that international comity will be disrupted. As one court phrased it: A similar legal standard also facilitates planning and compliance by corporate defendants.
Even in the field of securities regulation, there are important differences among jurisdictions. For example, the U.S. generally requires proof of scienter in secondary market cases (while Canada does not); similarly, the U.S. has a periodic disclosures system, while other jurisdictions (including Canada) require disclosure as soon as information becomes material. 72 As a practical matter, it is unlikely that a settlement class presented to a U.S. court for approval based on its supplemental jurisdiction would hold the defendant to higher standards than applied in the U.S.
The point here is not that there is an optimal rule as to which legal standards should govern, but only that U.S. interest groups probably gain from expanded use of supplemental jurisdiction in class action litigation.
C. A Proposed Balance.
The most likely scenarios in which a U.S. court will be asked to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction to resolve claims brought by persons who did not trade in the U.S. are: (1) settlement classes and (2) litigation classes governed by U.S. law (such as an Israeli class action). In these cases, no "novel or complex" issue seems likely to arise that justifies declining the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1347 (c)(1). 73 Still, merely the absence of a "novel or complex" issue does not imply that the case should be heard in a U.S. court. Even if the case is "substantially related" to another case in which class members did trade in the U.S., more seems necessary before the U.S. opens its courts to the foreign action. For example, suppose a German corporation that is listed on both 72 In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n. 17 (1988) the Supreme Court noted that "silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading…" Such a duty to disclose arises when the corporation sells stock and when SEC reporting obligations attach (such as when Form 10-K or Form 10-Q require periodic disclosures). Some other nations, including Canada, require disclosure of all material information at all times. 73 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c) lists instances in which a court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, even when a case is "substantially related." Subsection (c)(1) specifies that the court may decline a case that raises a "novel or complex issue" of law. Foreign law will often present such issues. a U.S. exchange and a European exchange is sued for securities fraud, eventually settles with investors who purchased in the U.S., and then seeks to achieve a global resolution by also settling claims in the U.S. action brought on behalf of investors numerous who traded in Europe.
Before the court exercises its supplemental jurisdiction to take this case, it should ask itself three additional questions:
First, did fraudulent conduct occur in the U.S. that gives the U.S. a justification for accepting jurisdiction? This is, of course, the traditional "conduct" test that was overturned by "poaching" on litigation that was already actively underway in Europe (or elsewhere). Indeed, in the Mylan N.V. case, the existence of pending actions in Israel was cited as an independent reason for the U.S. court not exercising its supplemental jurisdiction. 76 Here, rigid rules are undesirable, and the best approach may be for the U.S. court to consult informally with the foreign court (much as was done in Silver v. IMAX). 77 For example, if an action has been filed in Europe but lain dormant, the foreign court might have no objection to its resolution in the U.S.
by a settlement class. Also, because few countries authorize "opt-out" actions, the pending foreign action is likely to be an "opt-in" class or an action by a stichting (or similar entity), with the result that carving out the small number of plaintiffs in this action from the U.S. settlement class may be easily done and probably represents the best accommodation to avoid friction between the U.S. court and the foreign court. In any event, because those claimants represented abroad could always opt out from the U.S. settlement class, it may make little difference whether the U.S. settlement class is defined to exclude these litigants in pending cases.
CONCLUSION
This article opened with the observation that nature abhors a vacuum. We have now . 77 See text and note supra at notes 18 to 19. 78 See text and note supra at note 5 (noting $9 billion preliminary judgment). extent these claims are not so resolved in the U.S., these claimants may turn to a WCAM action in the Netherlands. The question thus posed for defendants may soon become where do they want to resolve these claims (in the U.S. or abroad?), because Morrison has not made them disappear.
For courts (both in the U.S. and the Netherlands), two issues stand out: (1) how to prevent the settlement class from being abused (as it has sometimes been in the U.S. 79 ), and (2) how to permit an integrated resolution of international claims without opening the litigation floodgates. This article has suggested standards to these ends.
Exercising uncharacteristic prudence, this author has stopped short of addressing the much more theoretical visions offered by other commentators who favor a global class action. 
